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Note
Tax Increment Financing: Public Use or
Private Abuse?
Alyson Tomme∗
In January 2000, Best Buy Co. (Best Buy) announced it
was locating its headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota, a move
that would consolidate the company’s various offices into one
1.5-million-square-foot complex and result in employment for
5,500 people.1 Best Buy selected Richfield after the city enticed
the company with a financing strategy called tax increment financing (TIF).2 Richfield had been losing its property tax base
due to recent funding cuts and a freeway expansion. Wooing
Best Buy generated approximately $7 million in annual property taxes, a stark increase from the $700,000 produced in the
area at that the time.3
Under the deal between Best Buy and Richfield, the city
was responsible for condemning all private property in the
forty-three acre redevelopment4 area using its power of eminent domain.5 To qualify for TIF, the current buildings in the
proposed redevelopment area first had to be found structurally

∗ J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
University of Notre Dame. The author thanks the editors of the Minnesota
Law Review for their persistence and helpful guidance and sends special
thanks to her family and roommate for their endless love, support, and good
times.
1. Best Buy Virtual Press Room, Study Finds Richfield Will Benefit as
Site of New Best Buy Headquarters, June 21, 2000, http://64.45.49.154/
bbyvpr/nr20000621-3.asp.
2. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 393
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002), aff ’d 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).
3. Best Buy Virtual Press Room, supra note 1; see also THE INT’L ECON.
DEV. COUNCIL, EMINENT DOMAIN RESOURCE KIT 24 (2005), http://www
.iedconline.org/Downloads/Eminent_Domain_Kit.pdf.
4. THE INT’L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL , supra note 3, at 23.
5. See Hous. & Red. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885,
887 (Minn. 2002).
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substandard;6 the city concluded that 91 percent of the buildings could be so defined based on insulation not in conformance
with new construction standards set forth in the Minnesota
Energy Code, and thereafter condemned several homes and
businesses.7
One affected business owner, Paul Walser, objected to the
condemnations.8 According to the city, his automobile dealership qualified for condemnation because it raised traffic noise
and safety concerns and was incompatible with nearby residences.9 He filed suit alleging that the TIF district did not
serve a public use when the city was taking the private property only to give it to a private entity.10 In the end, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that Richfield had not followed all
legal requirements necessary in setting up the redevelopment
area,11 and in order to continue with its plan, Richfield settled
with Walser.12 Today, Best Buy corporate headquarters stand
in the disputed location, which continues as a TIF district.
Tax increment financing is attractive to municipalities like
Richfield because it has become increasingly difficult to initiate
creative public financing techniques.13 With TIF, local government authorities will designate an area as a TIF district and
freeze the tax base at a given year’s level.14 The TIF development should generate additional tax revenue above this set
base line, which will then finance the TIF project15 and eliminate the need to increase taxes.16

6. Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 394.
7. Id. at 394–95. Eighty percent of these determinations were made
without interior inspections. Id. at 394.
8. Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 665
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff ’d, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
9. Id. at 668–69.
10. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 399–
400.
11. See id. at 402–03.
12. Walser, Richfield Settle, BUS. J. (Minneapolis/St. Paul), Mar. 14, 2003,
at 12.
13. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 15
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
14. Id. at 22.
15. Id. at 16.
16. See infra notes 22–23, 27–29 and accompanying text.
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It sounds simple enough. TIF, however, is often used in
conjunction with the power of eminent domain, and frequently
results in private entities developing the TIF projects.17 The
United States Constitution and most state constitutions mandate that private property may only be taken for public use and
with just compensation.18 Thus, to utilize TIF and develop private property, often the government must first show a valid
public use before condemnation can occur. When a city condemns private property for a TIF development only to turn it
over to a private developer, the government action becomes
suspect and raises constitutional and public policy issues.
Despite these concerns, using TIF for economic development projects recently became much easier. In June 2005, the
United States Supreme Court, deciding Kelo v. City of New
London, effectively expanded the meaning of public use by
holding that a generalized economic benefit was a sufficient
public use when the government took property and then gave it
to a private developer.19 Broad concepts of public use to satisfy
eminent domain, such as that found in Kelo, are vital to the
continued use of TIF.
This Note asserts that the United States Supreme Court
erred in the Kelo decision and that TIF is in need of reform if it
is to comply with eminent domain principles. This Note explains how TIF first developed along with urban redevelopment
and slum clearance statutes, but today has evolved into an allencompassing financing method for local governments and private developers. Finally this Note explores the intersection of
TIF and public use interpretation and jurisprudence. Part I of
this Note outlines the history of TIF and its current use, procedures, and statutory standards. Part II describes how the application of public use in TIF projects has evolved from a narrow to an expansive use and summarizes the recent Supreme
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London. With this background, Part III scrutinizes the failings of current TIF standards and projects. Part IV suggests TIF reforms through implementing tighter statutory standards and stricter limitations
on private developers. In sum, this Note finds that TIF can be
17. Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The
Takings Clause and the Erosion of the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 543, 555–59 (2002).
18. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
19. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665–66 (2005).
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an effective public financing tool, but its current use is too lenient and provides no accountability when public monies may be
given to private entities.20 Ultimately, this Note urges states to
return TIF to its original function.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
A. THE BASICS: HOW TIF WORKS
Tax increment financing’s central premise is that when a
municipality undertakes a development project, it can expect
that the property value of the development site and neighboring properties will increase.21 TIF enables a municipality to use
additional future tax revenues generated by a current development project to finance the current development project itself.22 In this way, TIF projects are self-financing. Local governmental officials do not have to impose a new tax or a higher
tax rate, but instead reallocate new tax revenues from the TIF
district to pay for development costs.23
TIF policies are first implemented through creation of TIF
districts, which are special taxing districts.24 A TIF district
typically shares boundaries with a governing municipality or
may be a small section of the city itself.25 Once established, a
redevelopment authority governs the district and has the power
to enter into contractual agreements and sell TIF debt.26
Once the TIF plan is adopted, the municipality will freeze
the property tax base of the proposed project or contiguous ar-

20. Although this Note refers to public money being spent in regards to a
TIF project, public funds are not being expended per se. Rather, TIF reduces
the tax revenue generated in a given district. Use of TIF freezes the tax base
of the TIF district and then uses any tax money collected above that baseline
for financing the TIF project. Thus, in effect, public funds are used. For more
discussion on the basic workings of TIF, see infra notes 21–43 and accompanying text.
21. Michael T. Peddle, TIF in Illinois: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly,
17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 442 (1997).
22. Id. at 443.
23. CRAIG L. JOHNSON, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 3 (2002), http://www.realtor.org/SG3.nsf/files/TIFreport.pdf.
24. See Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing
and Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 162–63 (1998)
(illustrating that the local government must first designate a geographical
area as a TIF district when implementing TIF).
25. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5.
26. Id.
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eas at the base year.27 The assessed value of property within
the TIF district in the base year is the base assessed value
(BAV).28 After the base year is established, all taxing jurisdictions within the TIF district only share tax revenues generated
by the BAV.29 Therefore, the taxing districts are not deprived of
their tax revenue. However, all taxes collected above the BAV
belong to the redevelopment authority creating the TIF district.30 No other taxing unit in the TIF district has a claim to
this tax increment.31 Specifically, this tax increment—the
revenue resulting from the difference between the base year
and the current year—is diverted to the redevelopment authority, which will use funds to finance the development project.32
The TIF district collects the tax increment over its life, which
typically spans twenty to thirty years,33 and places it in a special tax-allocation fund until the district dissolves.34
Local governmental authorities usually issue bonds for a
TIF project and use the funds from the bond issue to pay the
project’s preliminary development costs.35 TIF bonds provide
significant savings to developers because interest rates are
much lower when obtained through government assistance
than through financial institutions, and most of these bonds
are tax exempt.36 Subsequently, the increment collected in the
district will be used to pay the principal and interest on the
bonds.37

27. Josh Reinert, Comment, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It
Time for Blight and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1026 (2001).
28. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 13, at 20.
29. Id. at 21.
30. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5.
31. Id.
32. Sam Casella, What is TIF?, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 1, 1 (James
Hecimovich ed., 1985).
33. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 13.
34. JIM CULOTTA, NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING:
AN ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING TECHNIQUE 4 (2000).
35. Casella, supra note 32, at 1.
36. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 4.
37. See Jeffrey I. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE U.S.
182, 184 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998) (“[T]he increment in land value generates
revenue to pay for the debt that was used to finance the expenditures that
helped to cause the increment in land value.”).
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TIF project financing is not limited to bonds and may include additional techniques. For instance, a municipality may
use its own funds to pay the initial development costs.38 In such
a case, the loan from the city is repaid using the tax increments.39 Alternatively, a city may utilize the “pay-as-you-go”
method under which developers obtain their own financing and
pay for initial costs, and the city later uses the tax increments
to reimburse the developer.40 This approach allows cities to
spend money on TIF projects only when revenue has is available, a politically attractive option for voters worried about
municipal debt and tax increases.41
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of TIF is its flexibility.
Per state statutes, TIF funds may generally be used, among
other things, to construct utilities, acquire property, resell
structures for residential use, or demolish outdated structures.42 TIF may also be used to finance miscellaneous costs associated with a project, such as environmental studies, engineering surveys, and building specifications.43
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
At its inception, TIF was a limited development tool statutorily restricted to redevelopment of blighted urban areas used
to combat urban decay.44 In recent years, however, states have
allowed the use of TIF for numerous development projects and,
as a result, TIF has become a comprehensive economic development device.
TIF originated in California in 1952 as a method of providing local matching funds for federal grants.45 In the 1970s
when California faced cuts in federal funding and Proposition
13, legislation that capped local property tax increases,46 TIF
became a source of revenue for economic development without

38. See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11–74.4–4(J) (WEST 2005).
39. See id. § 5/11–74.4–10.
40. Joyce Y. Man, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax
Increment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 87, 93.
41. Id.
42. Casella, supra note 32, at 5.
43. See Reinert, supra note 27, at 1028.
44. Chapman, supra note 37, at 182; accord CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1.
45. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 13, at 17.
46. Id.
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having to raise property taxes.47 California’s success in using
the financing capabilities of TIF did not go unnoticed. Several
states adopted TIF laws by the 1970s,48 and by 2003, all fifty
states had enacted TIF laws.49
With such increasing use, TIF began to expand beyond its
original intent. Municipalities and counties began to use TIF
for a range of projects, including commercial retail and hotel
endeavors.50 Through that expansion, TIF also developed into a
tool to relieve the fiscal stress51 that often results from the increase in financial obligations of municipalities as they provided costly services, such as infrastructure improvements and
police protection, to their residents and businesses.52 Thanks to
TIF, municipalities worried about fiscal stress could finance
development projects without raising taxes or spending additional funds in hopes that the TIF projects would increase their
tax base thereby generating more tax revenue.53
In addition, TIF became an incentive program for corporations and developers to build and locate in particular areas.54
TIF is used as a tool for states to cope with rampant competition for business development and job creation in which state
and local governments compete to recruit new companies, or alternatively, to retain existing companies in their cities.55 Minneapolis, for example, used TIF to finance the Target Corporation’s store and offices, and Los Angeles used TIF to help
finance the expansion of the Los Angeles Convention Center.56

47. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 2.
48. As of 2000, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had
adopted TIF laws. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1.
49. In 2003, North Carolina, one of two states without such laws, authorized TIF legislation. 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 2003-403, s.1-2.
50. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 1.
51. Chapman, supra note 37, at 186. Fiscal stress, however, is relieved
indirectly because the property tax is earmarked for debt service rather than
going directly into the general fund of a blighted jurisdiction. Id.
52. Id. Chapman explains that cities determine fiscal stress levels in relation to other cities: “[I]t is also evident that some jurisdictions are more fiscally stressed than others. While ‘unstressed’ jurisdictions may consistently
run budget surpluses, others are continually dipping into contingency accounts, borrowing from separate funds, instituting an array of new fees and
charges, dramatically reducing services or allowing public infrastructure to
deteriorate.” Id.
53. See id.
54. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 2.
55. Id. at 1.
56. Theresa J. Devine, N.Y. City Indep. Budget Office, Learning from Ex-
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C. CORE REQUIREMENTS OF TIF-ENABLING STATUTES
The general procedural steps taken when using TIF include: (1) initiation, (2) plan formulation, (3) plan adoption, (4)
plan implementation, and (5) plan evaluation and termination.57 TIF laws range from simplistic to highly detailed, but
possess commonalities as well. During the plan formulation
stage, two substantive statutory requirements—a finding of
blight and satisfaction of a “but for” test—provide the crux of
implementing TIF. Most TIF controversies that arise stem from
these constraints.
1. A Finding of Blight
TIF was originally intended to mitigate blight.58 Blighted
areas are thought to be a menace to public health, safety, and
welfare, and often are defined to include defective street layouts, unsanitary conditions, and the decay of building structures.59 A finding of blight creates the connection between private development and public use necessary for a government to
exercise its eminent domain powers to fund such a project.60
Statutes, however, rarely define what constitutes blight and do
not precisely measure such statutory terms as “substantial” or
“predominance.”61 Under Florida’s blight statute, for instance,
blighted areas are those characterized by a substantial number
of slum or deteriorating structures, predominance of inadequate street layout, or unsafe conditions.62 Over time, many
states broadened the interpretation of a “blighted area” to include areas that are reaching a point of disrepair so that the
TIF redevelopment would likely eliminate decaying areas and

perience: A Primer on Tax Increment Financing 3 (2002), available at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/TIF-Sept2002.pdf.
57. For a complete discussion of this five-stage process, see Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at
31, 31–56.
58. Chapman, supra note 37, at 185.
59. See IOWA CODE § 403.2 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 457.010 (2003).
60. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 37.
61. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-301(3)(B) (Supp. 2005); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 99.340(2) (LexisNexis 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 303.26(E)
(LexisNexis 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-9-103(a)(iii) (2005).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.340 (West Supp. 2005).
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stimulate growth.63 In addition, many states permit property to
be declared blighted where at least one of various subjective
criteria is met.64
While some states require that a blight finding be quantified, most states allow nonquantified measurements.65 By requiring a quantified finding, a state might strengthen its justification for using public funds for private development.66
However, in those states not requiring a quantified blight standard, a general finding of economic benefit may be sufficient
when the goal is to stimulate development of unblighted land.67
2. The “But For” Test
In addition to blight, statutes enabling TIF projects often
require that a redevelopment authority satisfy a “but for” test
in order to justify spending public funds. The “but for” test essentially asks: But for TIF, would the property have been developed?68 If the area would not have been redeveloped without
TIF, then the local government should benefit from the increased property tax base, which will in turn result in gains to
neighboring tax jurisdictions, thus providing a public use.69 On
the other hand, if economic redevelopment would have occurred
without public funds, then the tax increment would have also

63. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 37; see also Hous. & Redev. Auth. v.
Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
an auto dealership blighted because it was incompatible with nearby residential neighborhoods and created traffic safety and parking issues).
64. See, e.g., 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West 2003). Pennsylvania can
deem property blighted if there is “inadequate planning,” “excessive land coverage,” “lack of proper light,” “defective design and arrangement of the buildings,” “faulty street or lot layout,” or “economically or socially undesirable land
uses.” Id.
65. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 9.
66. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-99-4(3)(d)(1) (1994) (requiring the local
governing body to adopt a resolution that contains findings that “[n]ot less
than 50 percent, by area, of the real property within the tax increment district
is a blighted area and is in need of rehabilitation or conservation work.”).
67. See, e.g., JG St. Louis W. LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 523
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding blight where evidence showed that existing shopping mall needed to expand to remain commercially viable); Chapman, supra
note 37, at 186.
68. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 469.175, subdiv. 3(b)(2)(i) (2004); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 303.29 (LexisNexis 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-6-20(A)(5) (1991).
69. Peddle, supra note 21, at 445.
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occurred and a public use was not served.70 In this later scenario, the increment would provide the TIF district with unjustified revenue and would have unnecessarily subsidize a private developer.71 Therefore, satisfaction of the “but for” test
creates a link between using TIF in a given area and the public
use required to exercise eminent domain in that area.
Determining whether economic development would have
occurred in the absence of TIF is extremely difficult, especially
when many proposed projects require condemnation and because statutes rarely offer any guidelines.72 Most states require
projects to satisfy some sort of threshold prior to approval, but
the threshold “but for” tests are typically easy to satisfy and not
uniformly applied.73 A common “but for” test requires a simple
finding that the development would most likely not occur without the assistance of public funds.74 For example, Minnesota’s
“but for” finding statute requires only that “in the opinion of
the municipality: (i) the proposed development or redevelopment would not reasonably be expected to occur solely through
private investment within the reasonably foreseeable future.”75
Due to the broad and nonspecific language in typical “but for”
findings by redevelopment authorities, there have been few
challenges to this aspect of TIF laws.76
As a result of the ease of most “but for” findings, the public
use necessary in many TIF projects also becomes relatively
simple. Redevelopment authorities have little trouble articulating a public use when they can assert that private development
would not otherwise occur. Moreover, the interpretation of public use has evolved to encompass most anything that will fit
under the broad definition of public purpose, making the test
for the appropriate use of TIF even less demanding.

70. Chapman, supra note 37, at 188.
71. Id.
72. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 39.
73. Id. Johnson and Kriz note that Kansas is one of the few states that
requires a comprehensive feasibility study. Id.
74. Id.
75. MINN. STAT. § 469.175 (2004).
76. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 39.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC USE
REQUIREMENT IN TIF PROJECTS
A. PUBLIC USE VERSUS PUBLIC PURPOSE
Before TIF is utilized, cities and states must often exercise
their eminent domain power thereby necessitating a showing of
public use under the U.S. and state constitutions.77 At the nation’s founding, property rights were considered fundamental.78
The Framers of the Constitution argued that property was necessary to secure all other rights and, as a result, protecting private property was the chief aim of government.79 John Locke
put forth this belief when he reduced all individual rights to
property.80 In 1790, John Adams reiterated this necessity when
he declared: “Property must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”81 Later, through the adoption of the Fifth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution protected citizens against arbitrary takings by
both federal and state governments.82
Given the primacy of the property rights at the founding,
public use was defined and interpreted narrowly in this era.
Public use for eminent domain purposes was not the equivalent
to public purpose, a more expansive standard later developed
by the courts. Instead, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the government’s eminent domain power required a literal public use meaning that any taking should primarily benefit the public.83 This interpretation restricted the
power of eminent domain to the construction of such things as

77. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13.
78. See infra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
79. Derek Werner, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings,
10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 337 (2001).
80. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough
ed., Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd. 3d ed. 1966) (1690) (“[E]very man has a property in his own person . . . .”).
81. JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA 92 (Boston, Russell & Cutler
1805) (1790).
82. The Fifth Amendment affords protection from the federal government
while the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Bill of Rights and makes most provisions in those ten amendments applicable
to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968).
83. Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Standard of Scrutiny
in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 3 (2003), http://www.lawrecord
.com (follow “Achieves” hyperlink; then follow “Volume 27” hyperlink; then follow “Time to Return to Higher Scrutiny in Defining Public Use” hyperlink).
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roads, mills, and parks.84 As a result, public use encompassed
that which intended to benefit the public directly and that
which the public had a right to use.85 Until the mid-twentieth
century then, public use under the Constitution did not fit under the broad umbrella of public purpose.
Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first
century, public purpose emerged as the standard to satisfy public use under the Takings Clause. With this standard, takings
were upheld if there was some indirect benefit to the public; the
public was not required to be able to use taken property directly. The taking simply must serve some purpose to the public. Public purpose thus is an easier threshold to meet.86
Courts have also recognized the distinction between public
use and public purpose.87 When the government has taken private property and given it to a private party, courts have emphasized that finding a proper public use entails a stricter
standard than finding a proper public purpose.88 For instance,
economic development is an important public purpose.89 However, to take private property so a private developer party can
develop it and thereby stimulate economic growth is not a public use.90 As the Illinois Supreme Court, in Gaylord v. Sanitary
District,91 stated: “[T]o constitute a public use, something more
than a mere benefit to the public must flow from the contemplated improvement.”92 Instead, courts historically indicated

84. Kruckeberg, supra note 17, at 546.
85. Kubasek, supra note 83.
86. See infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
88. See County of Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1320–21 (9th Cir.
1996); Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 794–95 (Mich. 2004) (Weaver, J.,
concurring); S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 7–11 (Ill.
2002).
89. See, e.g., People ex rel. City of Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 248
(Ill. 1980).
90. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 778–87. This rationale recognizes that every
lawful business will assist in economic growth, and the rationale therefore
does not allow a government to use its power of eminent domain. S.W. Ill. Dev.
Auth., 768 N.E.2d at 9. In this case, the development authority sought to take
the property of an automobile recycling facility and transfer it to the operator
of a nearby automobile racetrack to allow it to expand its parking lot. Id. at 3–
4. The Illinois Supreme Court held the taking was not for a legitimate public
use and was unconstitutional. Id. at 11.
91. 68 N.E. 522 (Ill. 1903).
92. Id. at 524.
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that to satisfy public use, the public, not a private business,
should be the primary beneficiary of the taking.93
B. ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION OF PUBLIC USE IN TIF
LEGISLATION
At the same time that states were narrowly exercising
eminent domain powers, they were adopting urban redevelopment and slum clearance statutes.94 When states passed these
statutes, they often did so with the intent of taking private
property and allowing private developers to improve blighted
areas.95 For example, during the Great Depression, governments sought to design programs to assist the poor and improve housing conditions.96 However, to satisfy eminent domain, those programs needed a public use. They were given
that use in New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,97 when
the New York Court of Appeals found that slum housing was
blighted and could be taken as a valid public use within the
government’s eminent domain power.98 The decision consequently opened the door for a broader view of public use.
Because TIF has its roots in urban development and slum
clearance statutes, TIF was originally limited to combating
blight and eradicating decaying areas.99 Only for such purposes
did expending public funds for TIF projects constitute a public
use. However, the Supreme Court altered the use of TIF when,
in a seminal case, it expanded the concept of public use.100

93. See Limits Indus. R.R. Co. v. Am. Spiral Pipe Works, 151 N.E. 567,
570 (Ill. 1962); Gaylord, 68 N.E. at 524; Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 788 (Weaver,
J., concurring); Bd. of Health v. Van Hoesen, 49 N.W. 894, 896 (Mich. 1891);
Foeller v. Hous. Auth., 256 P.2d 752, 766 (Or. 1953).
94. Rogers, supra note 24, at 153–54.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
98. Id. at 156.
99. See Hudson Hayes Luce, Note, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of
Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 392–93 (2000)
(describing blight as “the state of being a slum, a breeding ground for crime,
disease, and unhealthful living conditions”); see also Kruckeberg, supra note
17, at 546–47.
100. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (blurring the distinction between public purpose and public use).
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C. BERMAN V. PARKER: EQUATING PUBLIC PURPOSE WITH
PUBLIC USE EXPANDS TIF PROJECTS
In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court greatly broadened the meaning of public use.101 At issue was the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of
1945.102 The city sought to exercise its eminent domain power
to take a private business in an economically depressed area
and then transfer it to a private party for redevelopment.103
The building owners argued that the taking of their property
was unconstitutional because it was not slum housing.104 In
addition, they contended some of the property to be taken neither was in a blighted area nor endangered health or safety.105
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the taking and in
doing so expanded the traditional notion of public use to incorporate the standard of public purpose.106 The Court explained
that, for a state government, the scope of public use encompasses its police powers such that any takings that benefit the
health, safety, or welfare of the state’s citizens are valid public
use.107 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the power of government to attack blight in entire areas rather than eliminating it structure-by-structure.108 Therefore, a nonblighted property could be taken if it was located within a blighted area.109
Finally, the Court gave deference to legislative findings of
blight,110 citing the legislature as the “main guardian of the
public needs.”111 Berman consequently resulted in a lenient
public use standard for municipalities when exercising eminent
domain.

101. Id. at 33–35.
102. Id. at 28.
103. See id. at 27.
104. Id. at 36–37.
105. Id. at 34. (“[The property owners] maintain[ed] that since their building [did] not imperil health or safety nor contribute to the making of a slum or
blighted area, it [could not] be swept into a redevelopment plan by the mere
dictum of the Planning Commission or Commissioners.”).
106. See id. at 35–36.
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id. at 34–35.
109. Id. at 35 (“Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment
which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending.”).
110. Id. at 32–36. “In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of
values. It is not for us to reappraise them.” Id. at 33.
111. Id. at 32.
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Berman had a profound impact on eminent domain and
TIF cases. By declaring the legislature to be the appropriate
place for defining blight, the Court gave states extensive authority to determine valid public uses.112 States could utilize
the deference bestowed by Berman to justify TIF and pass legislation to further almost any development project.113
Following Berman, courts interchangeably used standards
of public use and public purpose, increasing the scope of the
government’s eminent domain power.114 If a public body decided that a project was in the public interest, courts would defer to the public body’s decision unless the determination was
fraudulent, obtained under undue influence, or was manifestly
arbitrary.115 Exercising eminent domain for the benefit of a private entity was acceptable as long as it served some public purpose.116
Courts began to consistently give states wide latitude for
takings. Traditional uses of TIF continued, but increasingly
any generalized economic benefit constituted a public use. Such
benefits included the creation of jobs,117 parking ramps,118 an
increase in the tax base,119 recreation facilities,120 relief of fiscal

112. Id. at 38.
113. See generally Alexandra Marks, Eminent Domain and Private Gain,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 9, 2003, at 1, 3 (“According to the Institute for
Justice . . . local governments went from condemning blighted areas to applying the practice to rundown neighborhoods.”).
114. See R. E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337–41
(Minn. 1978) (en banc); see also Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. City of Auburn Hills,
460 N.W.2d 258, 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam); Wolper v. City of
Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (S.C. 1985); Meierhenry v. City of Huron, 354
N.W.2d 171, 176 (S.D. 1984).
115. See, e.g., R. E. Short Co., 269 N.W.2d at 337–41; see also Sch. Dist. Of
Pontiac, 460 N.W.2d at 259.
116. See Wolper, 336 S.E.2d at 875; Meierhenry, 354 N.W.2d at 176.
117. Delogu v. State, 720 A.2d 1153, 1156 (Me. 1998) (holding that the expansion and modernization of a local shipyard facility served a public purpose
because it would create increased employment levels).
118. R. E. Short Co., 269 N.W.2d at 336–38 (declaring construction of a
public parking ramp by a private developer to be in the public interest and
permitting the use of TIF).
119. City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 390–91 (Minn. 1980)
(en banc) (concluding that TIF development of the City Center shopping facility in the downtown area served a public purpose because of the increase in
tax revenue).
120. State v. Unified Gov’t, 962 P.2d 543, 554 (Kan. 1998) (upholding the
use of TIF for an automobile race track facility).
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stress,121 and tourism.122 Moreover, a blight finding was relatively easy to satisfy, especially since Berman allowed condemnation of nonblighted property in blighted areas.123 Now, with
the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City
of New London,124 cities and states have virtually unfettered
discretion in determining what constitutes a public use.
D. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
In 1998, the city of New London, Connecticut, sought to
clear a portion of the Thames River waterfront in order to develop the property with commercial enterprises; a hotel, health
club, Coast Guard museum, and office space, were to complement the already-existing Pfizer Corporation global research
center.125 To initiate the project, the city exercised its eminent
domain power and condemned several homes.126 The homeowners refused to leave and filed suit arguing the condemnation
was an unjustified taking of their property.127 New London contended that the condemnations served constitutional public
uses because the proposed economic development plan would
create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize a distressed
city.128
The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with the City
that the mere promise of additional tax revenue justified the
condemnations even when a private entity was to undertake

121. See, S. Bend Pub. Transp. Corp. v. City of South Bend, 428 N.E.2d
217, 219 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of Indiana’s tax allocation financing statutes for redevelopment in blighted areas, and noting that one of
the legislature’s purposes for passing such statutes was to address fiscal constraints); Chapman, supra note 37, at 186.
122. See State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 887–88 (Fla.
1980) (per curium) (discussing precedent that establishes promotion of tourism
and entertainment among valid public purposes in addition to the traditional
slum clearance and elimination of blight).
123. See, e.g., Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 288 N.W.2d 85, 92–93 (Wis. 1980). The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of a fraternity house, despite the fact that it was properly maintained. Id. It was a valid public purpose for the city to take it in
order to create a TIF district because acquisition of the house was reasonably
necessary to eliminate blight. Id. at 91–92.
124. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
125. Id. at 2659.
126. Id. at 2660.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2658.
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the economic development.129 The court interpreted public use
broadly to hold that an economic development plan that serves
a public purpose constituted an appropriate use of eminent domain.130 As long as there was a benefit to the public’s general
welfare, any benefit to a private entity was purely incidental.131
In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s decision132 and embraced the broader interpretation of public use as public purpose. The Court found that while New London was not opening
the condemned land to use by the public,133 the city carefully
considered the development plan and determined that it would
benefit the community through new jobs and increased tax
revenue.134 The Court emphasized its deference to legislative
judgments as to what the public needs in order to justify a taking based on economic development.135 Promoting economic development, according to the Kelo Court, has traditionally been
a government function, and there is no principled way to distinguish it from other public purposes.136
Kelo swung open the door to virtually any taking for economic benefits and will likely bolster the use of eminent domain in TIF projects across the country. With Kelo in their arsenal, cities and states, absent stricter state public use
standards,137 may utilize TIF for most any development project
as long as it serves some broad public purpose.

129. See Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 531–36 (Conn. 2004)
(en banc), aff ’d 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
130. Id. at 527–28.
131. Id. at 531–32.
132. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2665–66. Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id. at
2658. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justice O’Connor filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas joined. Id. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id.
133. Id. at 2662.
134. Id. at 2665.
135. Id. at 2664–65, 2668. “[O]ur public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings
power.” Id. at 2664. “[W]e also decline to second-guess the City’s determination as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project.” Id.
at 2668.
136. Id. at 2665.
137. The majority in Kelo noted that the opinion does not preclude any
state from placing further restrictions on the takings power. Id. at 2668.
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III. HOW CURRENT LEGISLATIVE STANDARDS
CAN LEAD TO ABUSE OF TIF IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
With the legislative deference bestowed by Kelo, and with
economic development constituting a valid public use under the
Takings Clause, the use of TIF is likely to spread as statutory
and constitutional requirements have become even easier to
meet. As the TIF continues to develop, these new standards
may lead to abuse of TIF in development projects.
A. UNDER KELO BLIGHT AND “BUT FOR” ARE RENDERED
MEANINGLESS
Most states require that a proposed TIF area be blighted
and meet a “but for” test. However, states legislatures have often not been given judicial guidance in how to establish their
statutory criteria to accord with constitutional principles. The
courts’ silence and deference to legislatures results in a lack of
objective standards and inconclusive definitions of blight and
the “but for” test leading to constitutionally suspect takings in
connection with TIF projects.
Some TIF-enabling statutes, for example, traditionally define blight,138 but an area may also be blighted if declaring it as
such will discourage commerce or industry from moving to another state.139 In practice, blight findings depend upon municipalities’ and developers’ interpretation of the “but for” test140—
those same entities fueling the process in the first place. As a
result, redevelopment authorities often avoid genuinely
blighted areas and instead focus on those areas that contain
some conditions that will fit under the broad interpretation of
blight in order to attract developers to a project.141
138. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (2000). Missouri defines blight as:
an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of
site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or the
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and
other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the provision
of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare in its
present condition and use.
Id.
139. See, e.g., id. § 99.805(5).
140. Reinert, supra note 27, at 1034.
141. Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 322–25
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Take Best Buy. Its desired relocation area in Richfield was
not deleterious, infested with crime, or even at risk for deterioration,142 however, its tax revenues were decreasing.143 If Richfield had been truly blighted, it is unlikely that Best Buy would
have settled there; under such conditions the city would have
been inadequate to meet the company’s labor, market, transportation, and infrastructure needs. Instead, by utilizing a
broad interpretation of blight under the TIF statutes to condemn property, Richfield was able to attract Best Buy to the
city.
In addition, statutory standards become virtually meaningless when local government determines, interprets, and applies
the “but for” test and blight standards.144 Often, a municipality
declares an area blighted and asserts that the “but for” test has
been met without requiring a complete investigation into any
findings.145 With such simple thresholds to utilize TIF, coupled
with liberal notions of what constitutes public use under eminent domain,146 TIF can be used for almost any project.147
(2004).
142. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 394
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the initial investigation into the proposed
TIF district found the area to be in generally good condition).
143. THE INT’L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 23.
144. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 320–25; cf. Rogers, supra note 24, at
169 (arguing the TIF statutes of some states are so broad that they provide no
restriction at all).
145. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 394–95;
Gordon, supra note 141, at 323–25. For example, the city of Richfield hired a
firm to investigate the conditions of buildings in the area slated for Best Buy
because, pursuant to section 469.174, subdivision 10(a)(1) of the Minnesota
Statutes, property cannot qualify as a TIF district unless there is a showing
that 50 percent of the buildings are structurally substandard. Walser Auto
Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d at 394. The firm concluded that 91
percent of the buildings fit the criteria, though it inspected the interior of only
20 percent of the buildings and did not review any fire or police reports for the
properties. Id. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, found the TIF district to be created unlawfully. Id. at 404.
146. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005)
(finding that the prospect of new jobs and increased tax revenue was a valid
public use); State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875, 891 (Fla.
1980) (per curium) (permitting a redevelopment agency to condemn private
residential land in order to redevelop it and sell the land to private individuals, associations, or corporations for private commercial and industrial purposes).
147. See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN 7 (2003), available
at http:///www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED_report.pdf (discussing how
using increased taxes and jobs as justifications for the exercise of eminent domain leaves almost any property up for grabs).
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Such flexibility is cited as one of TIF’s strengths.148 Perhaps this is true for TIF used outside the context of eminent
domain, but when government must take private property, constitutional principles and individual rights are implicated. Instead this flexibility, when coupled with the power of eminent
domain, has increased the number of TIF projects while not
necessarily increasing tax revenues within TIF districts.149 In
1998, for instance, California reported that utilizing TIF resulted in two dollars spent for every dollar gained.150
With the increased use of eminent domain in conjunction
with TIF projects, challenges to the condemnations arise, but
remain an uphill battle when it is not required that specific
definitions and standards be met before designating a TIF district. In Lakewood, Ohio, for instance, the city sought to build
new luxury condominiums and an upscale shopping mall overlooking a riverfront in order to increase and strengthen its tax
base of aging residents, despite the areas existing, wellmaintained neighborhood.151 In order to use eminent domain
and support a finding of blight, the city changed its blight
standard.152 Under the new standard a home was blighted if it
did not have three bedrooms, two baths, an attached two-car
garage, and central air.153 In Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania,
private owners of an upscale shopping mall sought a blight designation in order to qualify for TIF so they could revamp “the
mall’s parking garage and redesign an intersection leading to
the mall.”154 However, the conditions cited as blighted were minor problems due to simple neglect and poor upkeep.155 Ultimately, this TIF project was rejected by the city’s school

148. Reinert, supra note 27, at 1036.
149. See BERLINER, supra note 147, at 26–27; Reinert, supra note 27, at
1037.
150. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 26–27.
151. Eminent Domain: Being Abused?, CBSNEWS.COM, July 4, 2004, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/printable575343.shtml.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Eric Montarti, Tax Increment Foolishness, ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB.
POL’Y, June 10, 2002, http://www.alleghenyinstitute.org/briefs/ vol2no29.pdf.
155. Id.
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board,156 and the Ohio project was rejected by the voters of
Lakewood.157
Local governments, like Lakewood, may often freely determine statutory definitions.158 As a result, property owners
and area citizens are rarely successful when challenging a finding of blight and a “but for” determination,159 especially when
courts afford great deference to state legislatures.
B. TIF MAY CAUSE A LOSS OF CONTROL OVER TAX BASES
While an increase in a tax base is cited as a valid public
use for TIF projects, TIF districts pose potentially negative effects to the tax base in the form of cost spillovers and increased
taxes in neighboring areas.160 Ideally, TIF would be a selffinancing mechanism, as its proponents contend.161 However,
local government at the county level is often ignored in the TIF
process. When states permit a city to create TIF districts without any approval at the county level, it can result in diverting
tax revenue from the county to a city development project.162
Consequently, taxpayers outside the TIF district may need to
meet the tax differential.163 Municipal-service costs, such as police, fire, sanitation, and transportation, typically rise as TIF
projects develop.164 Since property taxes for those property
owners within the TIF district are based upon assessments
made before the commencement of the TIF project, property
taxes collected within the district are likely to fall short of being able to meet the increasing cost of municipal services. Con-

156. Jake Haulk & Frank Gamrat, The Lazarus TIF—The Start of Something Bad, ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www
.alleghenyinstitute.org/briefs/vol4no3.pdf.
157. Lakewood Public Library, Proposed West End Project, http://www
.lkwdpl.org/currentevents/westend (last visited Sept. 28, 2005) (indicating that
the proposal failed by 47 votes).
158. See supra notes 140, 144–45, 152–53 and accompanying text.
159. See Peddle, supra note 21, at 448–50.
160. See Devine, supra note 56, at 5.
161. Joyce Y. Man, Introduction to TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 13, at 1, 3.
162. CULOTTA, supra note 34, at 5.
163. Id. Brandt Richardson, Administrator for Dakota County, Minnesota
noted that, “This [loss of control over property tax rolls] is compounded by the
fact that TIF-induced development imposes real, additional costs on county
government, which must be passed on to non-TIF taxpayers.” Id.
164. Devine, supra note 56, at 5.
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sequently, taxpayers outside the district may be called on to
pay additional taxes to account for lost revenue.165
While it is possible that an increase in sales and income
taxes generated within a TIF district will cover these additional
service costs,166 it is difficult to determine the amount of additional tax revenue at the outset of a given project. Furthermore, at least one study suggests that TIF subsidies help
growth within the district at the expense of growth outside the
district.167 Overall, cities and counties are confronted with uncertainty accompanying the adoption of TIF districts, as those
authorities are not able to adequately assess the future of their
tax revenues.
C. TIF GIVES PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO PRIVATE
DEVELOPERS
Private developers are the driving force behind the use of
TIF168 because TIF depends upon increases in property values
and is more aptly suited for commercial investment projects.169
As a result, private developers seek to utilize the broad discretion afforded in most TIF statutes to subsidize a potentially
profitable venture.170
When statutory compliance with the requirements of a
blight finding and the “but for” test is loosely defined, private
developers can easily obtain the benefit of TIF.171 In conjunction with a local government, these developers must identify
only one problem implicating health and safety in the development area to qualify it as blighted.172 In addition, the “but for”
test often allows private developers themselves to determine
natural economic growth prospects in a potential development
area173 By permitting private developers to work so closely with

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Richard F. Dye & David F. Merriman, The Effects of Tax Increment
Financing on Economic Development 22 (Inst. of Gov’t and Pub. Affairs, Working Paper No. 75, 1999), available at http://www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/
workingpapers/WP75-TIF.pdf.
168. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 321–22.
169. Id. at 319.
170. Id. at 320–22.
171. See id. at 322–29.
172. Id. at 320–21.
173. Id. at 324.
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a government when it proposes a TIF project, a local government may fail to give adequate consideration to state and regional concerns.174
Furthermore, local governments and private businesses do
not necessarily looking out for the public benefit. Municipalities
will agree to condemn and take private property because not
only do they foresee substantial economic benefits for the public, but they also will not have to pay for the property, any attorney’s fees, and any additional studies needed to get approval
for the proposed TIF project. Private developers like to work
with governments because “just compensation”175 will likely be
less than what private developers would pay on the open market.176 Condemnation statutes require that the government pay
only fair market value of the property;177 the government does
not have to consider additional costs of relocation that may be
incurred by the property owner, or the emotional costs of detachment from a home.178 Moreover, in today’s real estate market, the fair value of an older home may only buy a smaller,
comparable home.179 For businesses, just compensation does
not cover the loss of goodwill or the costs of moving an established business to a different locale.180 Thus, private developers
would rather use the government’s power than negotiate a
price with private owners themselves.
Additionally, preferential treatment of commercial interests may not result in any overall benefit.181 Cities and states
often compete over attracting business firms to their respective
locations and will use TIF as an incentive.182 If a firm moves a
short distance from City A to City B, there is little economic
benefit to the region.183 Yet if TIF is used, City B may see some
economic benefit, but the region as a whole will lose by paying
174. See id. at 321–23 (explaining how the determination of blight is driven
by private investment).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
176. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 18-1A-22 (LexisNexis 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-1122(C) (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-117 (2004); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 26-513 (2000); BERLINER, supra note 147, at 6–7.
177. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 18-1A-22; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1122(C);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-56-117; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-513.
178. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 6–7.
179. Id. at 6.
180. Id. at 7.
181. Man, supra note 161, at 5.
182. Man, supra note 40, at 95.
183. Peddle, supra note 21, at 453.

TOMME_3FMT

236

11/22/2005 04:32:39 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:213

a subsidy to the business that would have remained in the region employing the same population regardless of TIF incentives.184
Moreover, competition may make it more difficult for local
governments to redistribute money and services to its lowincome citizens.185 Typically, local fiscal systems are designed
to give more public services and require less in taxes by lowincome residents while businesses and upper-income residents
pay more taxes and receive less in public services.186 However,
with competition comes increasing mobility of businesses, making redistribution by local government authorities more challenging.187 TIF may thereafter reward private development and
overlook the overall effects on a local region.
D. TIF DEVELOPMENT IS UNABLE TO ENSURE PUBLIC BENEFITS
Since private developers ultimately drive the use of TIF,
the public is only minimally involved in TIF development projects and is not guaranteed any benefit from such development.
In fact, several studies have found that the growth rates in TIF
districts are usually not significant or increase to the detriment
of other communities.188 One city auditor noted that a typical
project produced only 23.7 percent of projected revenues and
questioned the effectiveness of TIF because the private sector
steers the process.189 A study conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California found that TIF projects produced small
gains in economic growth while resulting in a higher allocation
of tax revenue to the local redevelopment agency.190 Likewise,
economists Dye and Merriman determined that TIF adoption in
one district may stimulate growth in that district at the expense of the larger city.191

184. Id.
185. Timothy J. Bartik, Eight Issues for Policy Toward Economic Development Incentives, REGION, June 1996, at 43, 45.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. See BERLINER, supra note 147, at 26–27; Dye & Merriman, supra note
167, at 25.
189. Sinclair Mktg., Inc. v. Tax Increment Fin. Comm’n, No. 99-0374-CVW-6, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7447, *5 n.2 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 1999).
190. BERLINER, supra note 147, at 26–27.
191. Dye & Merriman, supra note 167, at 25. Specifically, Dye and
Merriman found that one particular TIF area gain of $1.6 million in property
value cost the non-TIF area $4.4 million. Id. at 29.

TOMME_3FMT

2005]

11/22/2005 04:32:39 PM

TAX INCREMENT FINANCING

237

When a city uses eminent domain to transfer land to a private developer, the initial, articulated public use is left in the
hands of the private developer to facilitate.192 Any benefit to
the public will depend upon the management quality of the private development team, the whims of the current marketplace,
and the quality of the businesses set to occupy the TIF district.193 The public is given no assurance of benefits, has little
to no control over how the private developer finally implements
the TIF plan, and has no recourse if the TIF project ultimately
fails.194 While it is not always feasible to give the public definite
guarantees, it is possible to revise standards in order to provide
more legitimacy behind TIF projects—a necessity when public
funds and private developers are involved.
IV. REFORMING PUBLIC USE AND RENEWING
CONFIDENCE IN TIF PROJECTS
A. COURTS MUST ABANDON THEIR DEFERENCE TO
LEGISLATURES AND GIVE GUIDANCE WHEN APPLYING
EMINENT DOMAIN PRINCIPLES
Currently, courts grant state legislatures great deference
when it comes to finding a public use, resulting in TIF districts
for a wide variety of projects.195 When legislatures are deciding
policy issues, deference is appropriate since legislatures are
policy-making entities. However, eminent domain and TIF are
not mere policy issues. Both involve constitutional concerns,
requiring judicial interpretation and guidance.
By giving legislatures deference to determine public use
courts ignore the inherent constitutional core of TIF projects
and, more significantly, their judicial obligations.196 The judici192. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 172–73.
193. Id. at 174.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., R. E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337
(Minn. 1978) (en banc); Wolper v. City of Charleston, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (S.C.
1985). But see Christensen v. Boston Redev. Auth., 804 N.E.2d 947, 951 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004) (“The . . . determination that a project site is blighted must be
supported by substantial evidence.”).
196. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). Chief
Justice Marshall wrote:
It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So, if
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ary has the power to interpret the Constitution, apply its principles, and instruct on its proper use.197 Consequently, when
confronted with an eminent domain issue, such as those that
arise in TIF, courts should be clear on how to apply public use
and not rely on a subjective and generic “generalized economic
benefit” rationale.198
The Framers did not intend public use to entail a general
economic benefit.199 Such a rationale opens the door to eminent
domain abuse. Lower-tax producing businesses are more likely
to be taken and replaced with higher-tax producing ones.200
a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case, conformable to the law, disregarding the constitution;
or conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case: this
is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. at 176.
197. See id.
198. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor admonished the majority for not
following its constitutional duty: “[T]he Court suggests that property owners
should turn to the States, who may or may not choose to impose appropriate
limits on economic development takings. This is an abdication of our responsibility.” Id. Note, however, that some states did take control after Kelo by introducing legislation to clarify that a general economic benefit is not the
equivalent of a public use in condemnation proceedings. For example, on August 31, 2005, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed this type of legislation into
law. Press Release, Rick Perry, Texas Governor, Gov. Perry Signs New Law
Protecting Property Rights (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.governor.state.tx.us/
divisions/press/pressreleases/PressRelease.2005-08-31.3313. The Delaware
Senate also recently passed such legislation. See S.B. 221, 143rd Gen. Assem.
(Del. 2005) (prohibiting condemnation of private property where no specific
public use is to be made of the property and specifically excluding revenue
generation, economic development, and redevelopment of currently occupied
residences as public uses). The legislation now awaits a vote by the Delaware
House. See DELAWARE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 143RD GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SENATE BILL # 221 W/SA 1, SA 2, http://www.legis.state.de.us/LIS/lis143.nsf/
vwLegislation/SB+221 (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).
199. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681–82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (outlining the
early history of public use and how the Court has erred in equating public use
with public purpose); supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
200. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or
any farm with a factory.”). Immediately following the Supreme Court’s Kelo
decision, public officials in Freeport, Texas began proceedings to take two family-owned companies to make way for an $8 million private boat marina. See
Web Release, Institute for Justice, Homeowners Ask U.S. Supreme Court: Rehear Eminent Domain Case, (July 18, 2005), http://www.ij.org/private_
property/connecticut/7_18_05pr.html.
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Those citizens with greater influence, power, and wealth are
more likely to benefit from such a wide-ranging public use rationale,201 especially when poorer homeowners and small businesses do not have ample financial resources to challenge and
litigate an eminent domain action.202
The Framers of the Constitution could not have intended
this perverse result when they wrote the Fifth Amendment.
The judiciary fails to do its duty when it gives absolute deference to legislatures to determine what comprises public use.
Deference in the name of institutional competence should not
be transformed into free reign for legislatures to ignore the
mandate of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
B. BRING BLIGHT AND “BUT FOR” BACK TO THEIR ROOTS
Blight was developed to encompass the wide range of projects that local government and private developers presently
contemplate.203 Therefore, in order to validate the use of TIF, a
stricter definition of blight and the “but for” test should be implemented. For example, a general finding that increased traffic negatively affects public safety should be insufficient to support a finding of blight when the increased traffic has posed no
problems and buildings adequately fit their intended use.204 To
hold otherwise would be to ignore individual property rights. If
TIF projects adhere to stricter standards, a public use will be
served under TIF statutes.
By allowing TIF projects only where blight will not be
eradicated without the help of TIF, the “but for” test will ensure that public funds are going to a public use and not solely
to private developers’ coffers. A stricter definition of blight and
mandatory application of the “but for” test would also give TIF
projects more legitimacy and, more importantly, would justify
the use of eminent domain. In theory, freezing a blighted tax
base should result in a much larger tax increment, so TIF
would naturally be more successful in truly blighted areas.
201. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing the disproportionate effect of economic benefit takings and the potential to transfer
property from those with fewer resources to those with more under a public
use rationale).
202. See Web Release, Institute for Justice, supra note 200.
203. Rogers, supra note 24, at 152–55.
204. See Hous. & Redev. Auth. v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662,
669 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), aff ’d, 641 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 2002).
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Various standards for blight would suffice. For example, a
blighted area could be characterized by:
the existence of buildings and structures, used or intended to be used
for living, commercial, industrial, or other purposes, or any combination of such uses, which are unfit or unsafe for such purposes and are
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, and crime because of any one . . . of the following
factors:
(a) Defective design and character of physical construction.
(b) Faulty interior management and exterior spacing.
(c) . . . overcrowding.
(d) Inadequate . . . ventilation, light, [and] sanitation.
(e) Age, obsolescence, deterioration, [and] dilapidation . . . .205

This definition adheres to the original notion of blight and provides stricter criteria to find blight than most of today’s TIF
statutes.206 Under this definition, in order to qualify as blight,
not only must an area be unfit or unsafe to use and conducive
to sickness and crime, it must also be marked by at least one of
the above-proposed factors. In this way, a blight designation
must be based on multiple characteristics rather than on only
general findings of public health and safety concerns.207
In addition, requiring a “but for” finding as a prerequisite
to proceed with TIF projects would add authority to the use of
TIF. A stringent statute with a “but for” standard would necessitate a determination, supported by concrete facts and independent review, that the redevelopment of the slated TIF area
could not be accomplished by private enterprise acting alone.
To protect constitutional principles, a statute may go even further by adding that TIF projects necessitating the use of eminent domain involve a compelling economic need.208 In con205. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33041 (1951) (repealed 1963) (current
version at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (West Supp. 2005); see also
Redev. Agency v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (citing blight
criteria set forth in the CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 33041).
206. For an example of a current, broad blight definition, see ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-1471(2) (Supp. 2004).
207. Cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (declaring the legislature
as the main guardian of the public needs to be served by legislation enacted in
exercise of the police power even when eminent domain is involved); Hous. &
Redev. Auth. 630 N.W.2d at 668–69 (approving the city’s finding of blight
where car dealerships were located close to residential homes, allegedly
caused too much noise, brought heavy traffic to the dealerships, and had inadequate parking, despite a building consultant’s finding that the spaces were
not obsolete for their use).
208. Cf. Schneider v. Dist. of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 117 F. Supp.
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structing a “but for” statute in this manner, legislatures will
ensure that TIF projects occur only in truly blighted areas and
will avoid giving private developers incentives to do what is already in their own best interest.
Therefore, tighter limitations on condemning land and
transferring it to private developers should apply to TIF projects. Public use is not equivalent to public purpose, as the
Berman and Kelo courts proclaimed.209 To be a public use, a
TIF project should entail public oversight, be necessary for
things like public infrastructure, roads, railroads, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or be based upon a public
concern like slum clearance.210
The Court in Kelo ignored the original intent of public use
and demonstrated why TIF statutory requirements must be
stricter.211 Kelo perpetuates a broad interpretation by regarding a generalized economic development as sufficient public
use.212 While it was a worthy goal to revitalize the New London’s riverfront area, it is possible that the use of eminent domain and TIF were not necessary to facilitate development, as
private developers would likely have eventually developed the
property regardless of incentives because of Pfizer’s global research facility already existing along the Thames River.213
Likewise, a government should not be free to take private
property and give it to another private owner simply because
the government believes the land is not being put to its most
desirable use.214 Using a tool as drastic as eminent domain re-

705, 723 (D.D.C. 1953) (noting that a finding of a compelling economic need
justifies the exercise of eminent domain).
209. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2682–84 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); see also County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765, 778 (Mich. 2004) (recognizing that Wayne County’s intentions in building
the Project—creating jobs and increasing tax revenue—were valid public purposes, while clarifying that giving the condemned property to private developers was not a public use).
210. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781–82.
211. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
212. See id. at 2664–65
213. Id. at 2659; cf. Gordon, supra note 141, at 322, 324 (discussing private
investors holding out for “the blight that’s right” in order to receive TIF subsidies); Rogers, supra note 24, at 176 (explaining that TIF is being used increasingly at the request of developers).
214. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the
logic of the majority allows eminent domain only to upgrade, not downgrade,
property); Schneider v. Dist. Of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 117 F. Supp.
705, 724 (D.D.C. 1953) (“One man’s land cannot be seized by the Government
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quires careful observance of individual rights and the original
conception of public use. Only by employing the “but for” test
and a more restrictive definition of blight can TIF meet these
requirements and pass constitutional muster.
C. LEGISLATURES MUST PROVIDE OBJECTIVE STANDARDS TO
ESTABLISH TIF DISTRICTS
Where TIF enabling statutes require satisfaction of the
“but for” test, cities are given discretion in determining
whether blight exists in a particular area and whether the “but
for” test has been satisfied.215 This discretion results in too
much subjectivity and inadequate accountability, thereby failing to ensure the proper use of public funds.216 Today most
state statutes do not define blight in specific terms or require
comprehensive studies demonstrating satisfaction of the “but
for” test.217 Most state statutes do not command municipalities
to quantify blight findings, predict future results, find a specific
number of blighted conditions, or undergo any formal review
throughout the project.218 As a result, proposals for TIF districts receive practically automatic approval without much evidentiary support of the need for TIF.
To remedy this, state legislatures should require specific
quantified findings and procedural hurdles before a TIF project
is put into effect. First, more than one blight condition should

and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may build upon it
a better house or a house which better meets the Government’s idea of what is
appropriate or well designed.”); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 464 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (describing how no property is immune from condemnation for the benefit of private
interests that will put it to “higher use” when a general economic benefit rationale is used), overruled by Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765.
215. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664, 2668 (declaring the legislature the appropriate authority to determine what constitutes a public use).
216. But see George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that’s Right for California
Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1005–08 (2001) (noting several
negative consequences that might result from a more restrictive definition of
blight).
217. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 38–39.
218. See id. at 38–43; see also, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-7-14-41(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2004) (permitting the commission to determine that a geographic area
is an economic development area if it finds that the plan “(A) Promotes significant opportunities for the gainful employment of its citizens; (B) Attracts a
major new business enterprise to the unit; (C) Retains or expands a significant
business enterprise existing in the boundaries of the unit; or Meets other purposes [specified in the statute]”).
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be found to support a blight label.219 In addition, quantified
findings of blight should entail in-depth analysis of a TIF area,
including scrutinizing the physical structures, economic conditions, and criminal activity within an area.220 Quantifiable criteria are inherently more straightforward and provide a good
safeguard against potential abuse.221 Finally, a finding of blight
should be supported with evidence from an independent agency
or consultant, and not rest on the determination of biased redevelopment agencies and private developers.222
Furthermore, municipalities should not head into a TIF
project haphazardly. Redevelopment authorities should be expected to formulate predictions for future costs and benefits for
the public, while assessing the state of the local economy, the
impact of the project on community citizens, and any possible
changes in policy.223 A cost-benefit analysis would legitimatize
the use of TIF by essentially confirming that the project meets
the public use requirement as the term was originally interpreted. By undergoing a genuine cost-benefit analysis, cities
should naturally be limited to using TIF for projects such as
slum clearance, railroad creation, and eliminating unfit housing—all valid public uses through the act of condemning and
exercising eminent domain.224

219. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 6–33–30(1) (1991) (lacking a requirement
that more than one blight condition be found before a property is labeled
blighted) with MINN. STAT. § 469.002, subdiv. 11 (2004) defining a “blighted
area” as
any area with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design,
lack of ventilation, light, and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use, or obsolete layout, or any combination of
these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health, morals, or
welfare of the community.
MINN. STAT. § 469.002, subdiv. 11.
220. See JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 8–9 (explaining that broad definitions
of blight, particularly those without quantifiable and measurable criteria, nullify TIF statute provisions that require officials to opine on the level of blight
in a potential project area).
221. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 57, at 38.
222. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 174–75.
223. See Kruckeberg, supra note 17, at 578–79.
224. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–82 (Mich.
2004) (differentiating between acts of condemnation that served a public use
and condemning land that will eventually be put to public use). The Hathcock
court noted that, “the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation,
rather than the subsequent use of condemned land, must satisfy the Constitution’s public use requirement.” Id. at 783.
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Finally, an independent board should objectively review
TIF proposals to prohibit any abusive use of the power of eminent domain.225 This oversight mechanism could include
economists, outside city planners, disinterested private developers, and local citizens, ensuring that private-public TIF ventures remain accountable to the public.226 In total, objective
standards would reduce the possibility of a revenue shortfall
and instill public confidence in the development.
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS MUST LIMIT THE RIGHTS OF PRIVATE
DEVELOPERS RECEIVING THE BENEFITS OF TIF
Presently, private developers are the driving force behind
TIF because they want to reduce their expenses associated with
a development project. Governments should therefore be wary
of being pushed into projects that are not in their constituents’
best interests.
Private developers wishing to condemn private property for
a TIF district should first explore other financing alternatives.227 They could enter into good faith discussions with property owners and consider viable proposals rather than turning
to taxpayer-subsidized redevelopment.228 By doing so, private
developers will produce evidence that TIF may be the only feasible method for a proposed project, thereby lending credence to
the “but for” requirement. In addition, before resorting to TIF,
private developers should research the proposed development,
including the market area and possible tax revenues, to help
ensure that the tax increments will not fall short.229 If TIF is
eventually utilized, private developers should bear some of the
risk that the TIF will not produce enough revenue. For example, the government of Hoffman Estates, Illinois required that

225. See Gordon, supra note 141, at 326–27, 333–34 (discussing the politics
surrounding TIF projects and abuse of redevelopment laws).
226. Id.
227. See generally Peddle, supra note 21, at 448–54 (discussing widespread
misuse of TIF in Illinois).
228. Rogers, supra note 24, at 176–77 (“Non-TIF options may include considering offers from other developers that do not require tax subsidies, as well
as entering into discussions and negotiations with current owners regarding
ways to increase tax revenues.”).
229. See generally Haulk & Gamrat, supra note 157 (documenting the
quick and growing use of TIF in retail and its potential negative consequences).
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Sears enter into a loan guarantee and pay the difference when
the tax increments fell short of required payments and projected revenues.230
A public oversight mechanism will also provide accountability on the part of cities and private developers while comporting with eminent domain and public use principles. Statutory and contractual restraints, rather than formal public
oversight, are not sufficient to focus a private developer on the
anticipated public benefit.231 Instead, when courts defer to legislatures’ judgments, they neglect to recognize the profit motivations of private developers and the legislatures inability to
guard against any potential misuse of public funds.232
More significantly, taken cumulatively, these suggested
limitations and regulations will secure public support for TIF
projects. Private business firms will be less likely to make any
relocation or expansion decisions solely because a city offers
TIF incentives. These suggested changes will compel these
businesses instead to thoroughly evaluate where they can simply receive tax breaks. All the while, the public would have
some power to influence projects, instilling greater legitimacy
in TIF endeavors between cities and private developers.
CONCLUSION
TIF remains a viable economic development tool. Problems
and abuses have arisen because the application of TIF has been
too broad and outside the scope of its initial intent. State legislatures can return TIF to its original purposes by tightening
the blight and “but for” standards, providing an independent
review of the procedures, and placing more restrictions on the
private developers benefiting from TIF. In turn, the TIF project
will be legitimized and eminent domain principles will remain
intact.
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City
of New London failed to recognize the fundamental importance
of property rights in this country and the difference between
public use and public purpose. Eminent domain may often be a
necessary means for a government to promote development and
perform its duties. Yet, if government is to take private property from private individuals only to allow another private en230. See Devine, supra note 56, at 4.
231. But see Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 544 (Conn. 2004).
232. See supra notes 135–36, 140–41, 169–71 and accompanying text.
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tity to develop such property, it is essential that the public receive direct benefits. When public use is defined to include almost anything, as it is under the Kelo decision, a public benefit
cannot be guaranteed. Without a sufficient public use, takings
have potential to abuse property rights of individual citizens.
Cities, states, and counties need guidance when they partake in public-private ventures. Courts cannot abandon their
constitutional duties and give legislatures the near-exclusive
power to determine what constitutes a public use. Public use in
TIF takings needs to be set at a narrower and stricter standard—at TIF’s original function and intent. Only then can TIF
be justified as a valid and essential public financing method.

